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Abstract  
The quantitative significance of shocks to the financial intermediary (FI) has not received 
much attention up to now. We estimate a DSGE model with what we describe as chained 
credit contracts, using Bayesian technique. In the model, credit-constrained FIs intermediate 
funds from investors to credit-constrained entrepreneurs through two types of credit 
contract. We find that the shocks to the FIs' net worth play an important role in the 
investment dynamics, accounting for 17% of its variations. In particular, in the Great 
Recession, they are the key determinants of the investment declines, accounting for 36% of 
the variations. 
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The ￿nancial crisis that began in the fall of 2007 demonstrated that ￿nancial inter-
mediaries (hereafter, FIs) play a crucial role in economic activity. Adverse shocks to
the FI sector increase the borrowing costs for the FIs by deteriorating their net worth.
Consequently, the supply of funds to entrepreneurs tightens, leading to an investment
decline and a further deterioration in the FIs￿net worth. This account is consistent with
the literature that focuses on the relationship between the FI sector and the aggregate
economy. For example, Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000), using a novel identi￿cation
scheme for a loan supply shock, report that the worsening of the FIs￿net worth generates
economic downturns.
However, there is as yet no body of literature determining how important the shocks
to the FI sector are to the U.S. business cycle. While macroeconomists agree that shocks
to the credit market are an important source of aggregate ￿ uctuations, to the best of our
knowledge only a limited number of studies have evaluated the relative impact of shocks
to the FI sector.1 In the existing models, shocks to the entrepreneurial net worth are
primarily focus and shocks to the FIs￿net worth are often neglected.
To assess the role of the shocks to the FIs￿net worth, we estimate the ￿nancial ac-
celerator model of Hirakata, Sudo, and Ueda (2009, 2011, hereafter HSU). Our model
is built upon the ￿nancial accelerator model in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999,
hereafter BGG) where endogenous developments in the entrepreneurial net worth play
an important role in amplifying and propagating exogenous shocks. In our model, FIs
intermediate funds from investors to entrepreneurs through two types of credit contract.
Because the FIs as well as the entrepreneurs are credit constrained, the ￿nancial ac-
celerator e⁄ect is enhanced due to developments in the FIs￿net worth along with the
entrepreneurial net worth.
Based on HSU (2009, 2011), we distill the shocks to the FIs￿net worth using a
Bayesian technique. We employ a set of U.S. macroeconomic variables consisting of
output, consumption, investment, in￿ ation, the policy rate, and the net worth of the
FI and entrepreneurial sectors.2 The sample period runs from 1984Q1 to 2010Q4, and
therefore covers the most recent turmoil in the credit market. We ￿nd that the estimated
adverse shocks to the FIs￿net worth typically take large negative values during the
recession, and are correlated with an indicator of credit market stress.
A negative shock to the FIs￿net worth causes a persistent decline in investment. In
particular, during the several quarters since 2007, the shocks to the FIs￿net worth were
1See, for example, Gilchrist, Yankov, and Zakrajsek (2009) and Jermann and Quardini (2009). The
notable exceptions are Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2008, 2009, hereafter CMR), who analyze
the shocks to the production technology of the banks separately from the shocks to the entrepreneurs.
While other empirical work, such as Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000), emphasizes the balance-sheet
e⁄ect in the FI sector, the banks in CMR (2008, 2009) are competitive and do not own their net worth.
In contrast, we focus on the shocks to the FIs￿net worth and their impact on the aggregate economy.
2As discussed below, we conduct several sensitivity analyses of the choice of observable variables.
2unprecedentedly deep and persistent, contributing to a drastic widening in the borrowing
spreads in that period. Their impacts on investment lasted a long time, lowering it for
several quarters after the end of the recession.
Quantitatively, the shocks to the FIs net worth are an important source of the invest-
ment dynamics, accounting for 17% of the investment variations throughout our sample
period. In particular, they are the main source of the investment slump during the Great
Recession, accounting for 36% of the investment variations during the period.
Since the shocks to the entrepreneurial net worth also drive a substantial portion of
the investment variations, the sum of the two net worth shocks explains 55% and 64% of
the investment variations over the entire sample period and the period of the Great Re-
cession, respectively. These net worth shocks are ampli￿ed to the macroeconomy thanks
to the credit market imperfection, reinforcing each other through the endogenous devel-
opments in the two net worths. This transmission mechanism is particularly consistent
with the key features of the Great Recession, including the ￿nancial market turmoil and
the collapse of the major ￿nancial institutions associated with the deterioration in the
FIs￿net worth.
The in￿ uence of the shocks to the FIs￿net worth on output and in￿ ation are minor,
accounting for only 4% of their variations over the entire sample period. Even during
the Great Recession, the shocks account for 7% of output variations and 9% of in￿ ation
variations. By contrast, the non-￿nancial shocks, in particular, the preference shocks
and the technology shocks, play the dominant role in explaining these variables.
Research using the ￿nancial accelerator model commonly poses one or both of two
questions.3 The ￿rst concerns the quantitative importance of the ￿nancial shocks that
originate in the credit market, and the second concerns the quantitative importance of
the ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ect. For instance, in response to the ￿rst question, Nolan
and Thoenissen (2009) report that shocks to the credit market account for 45% of the
investment variations. In response to the second question, Christensen and Dib (2008)
conclude that the ￿nancial accelerator mechanism brings the sticky-price dynamic sto-
chastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model closer to the data although they stress that
its quantitative contribution is small.4
By adding to the model credit-constrained FIs and shocks to their net worth, we
provide more extensive answers to the two questions. First, consistent with the existing
literature, our result implies that ￿nancial shocks originating in the credit market sub-
stantially a⁄ect the macroeconomy. Moreover, a sizable amount of the estimated shocks
to the credit market originates in the FI sector as well as in the entrepreneurial sector.
Second, in comparing ￿t with the data, we ￿nd that our model, in which both the FIs
and the entrepreneurs are credit constrained, outperforms the model in which only the
3See, for example, CMR (2008), Meier and Muller (2006), Christensen and Dib (2008), De Graeve
(2008), and Nolan and Thoenissen (2009).
4Meier and Muller (2006) derive a similar conclusion that the ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ect is small by
investigating impulse response functions to monetary policy shocks using U.S. data.
3entrepreneurs are credit constrained. Our comparison suggests that the ￿nancial acceler-
ator mechanism linked to endogenous developments in the FIs￿net worth is an important
element in explaining the data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our
economy. In Section 3, we describe the estimation method and the results. Section 4
concludes.
2 The Economy
We consider an economy with a credit market and a goods market. The economy consists
of 10 types of agents: investors, FIs, entrepreneurs, a household, ￿nal goods producers,
retailers, wholesalers, capital goods producers, the government, and the monetary au-
thority.
The setting for the credit market is taken from HSU (2009). There are three types
of participants in the credit market: investors, FIs, and entrepreneurs. Investors collect
deposits from the household in a competitive market, and invest what they collect in
loans to the FIs. FIs are the monopolistic lenders of funds to entrepreneurs. The FIs
own their net worth, but not su¢ ciently to ￿nance their loans to the entrepreneurs.
Therefore, they make credit contracts with the investors to borrow the rest of the funds.
Entrepreneurs invest in their projects, and also own their net worth, but not su¢ ciently
to ￿nance them. Thus, they make credit contracts with the FIs to borrow the funds.
Clearly, these two types of contracts are linked in the economy, and the entrepreneurs
cannot ￿nance their projects if either of the credit contracts fails to hold.
In the model, the monopolistic FIs determine the borrowing rates of the two credit
contracts, thereby ensuring the participation constraints of entrepreneurs and investors.
Agency problems arise from the asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers
for both of the credit contracts, one between the FIs and the entrepreneurs (hereafter,
FE contracts) and the other between the investors and the FIs (hereafter, IF contracts).5
Consequently, the borrowing rates of the credit contracts change with the net worth of
the borrowers.
The assumption of the monopolistic FIs is essential to our model. In BGG (1999),
the FIs face perfect competition, earning zero pro￿t. By contrast, since our FIs are the
monopolistic supplier of the loans to the entrepreneurs, they earn pro￿ts from the credit
5Our setting thus contrasts with other banking models based on the moral hazard problems of FIs
and entrepreneurs (Chen, 2001; Meh and Moran, 2004; and Aikman and Paustian, 2006). These studies
all develop quantitative extensions of the model in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and illustrate the role
of the net worth in the banking sector. Importantly, in their models a rise in the FIs￿net worth a⁄ects
the aggregate investment through the moral hazard problem among the entrepreneurs, the ￿rms, and
the investors. By contrast, our model stresses the role of the FIs￿net worth in a⁄ecting the economy
through the borrowing rates of the credit contracts.
4contracts, accumulating their own net worth.6 This setting is in line with the existing
studies such as Klein (1971), Monti (1972), and Freixas and Rochet (2008).
We closely follow BGG (1999) for the setup of the goods market. There are four
goods in the economy: ￿nal goods, retail goods, wholesale goods, and capital goods. Fi-
nal goods are produced by ￿nal goods producers from di⁄erentiated retail goods through
the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator. Retail goods are produced from wholesale goods by mo-
nopolistic retail goods producers that set the prices of their goods following Calvo (1983).
Wholesale goods are produced by competitive wholesalers that own a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction technology which converts capital and labor inputs into wholesale goods. Capital
goods are produced by capital goods producers and sold to the entrepreneurs. In what
follows, we brie￿ y describe our setting of the credit market and fully explain the goods
market.
2.1 The Credit Market
Overview of the two types of credit contract
In this section, we describe the framework of the credit contracts. In each period,
entrepreneurs conduct projects with size Q(st)K (st); where Q(st) is the price of cap-
ital and K (st) is capital. Entrepreneurs own their net worth, NE (st) < Q(st)K (st);
and borrow funds, Q(st)K (st) ￿ NE (st); from the FIs through the FE contracts. The
FIs also own their net worth, NF (st) < Q(st)K (st) ￿ NE (st); and borrow funds,
Q(st)K (st) ￿ NF (st) ￿ NE (st); from investors through the IF contracts. In both con-
tracts, agency problems stemming from asymmetric information are present. That is,
the borrowers are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks and the lenders cannot
observe the realizations of these shocks without paying additional costs.7 Taking these
credit market imperfections as given, the FIs choose the clauses of the two contracts that
maximize their expected pro￿ts. Consequently, for a given riskless rate of the economy




=R(st) is expressed by
6In the current model, the entrepreneurs are grouped and each of the groups is attached to a certain
type of FI. They cannot raise funds from another type of FI. Consequently, the competition among the
di⁄erent types of the FIs in the loan market is absent from the model.
7The idiosyncratic productivity shocks for the FIs and the entrepreneurs are log-normally distributed
with unit mean and standard deviations ￿F and ￿E; respectively. In Subsection 3.5, we investigate the


































ratio of the debt to the size of the capital investment








































































































where nF (st) and nE (st) are the ratios of net worth to aggregate capital in the two
sectors, and !F (st+1jst) and !E (st+1jst) are the cuto⁄ value for the FIs￿idiosyncratic
shock !F (st+1) in the IF contract and that for the entrepreneurial idiosyncratic shock
6!E (st+1) in the FE contract.89 Equation (1) is a key equation that links the net worth
of the borrowing sectors to the external ￿nance premium. The external ￿nance premium
is determined by three components: the share of pro￿t in the IF contract going to the
investors, the share of pro￿t in the FE contract going to the FIs, and the ratio of total
debt to aggregate capital. Lower pro￿t shares going to the lenders cause a higher external
￿nance premium through the ￿rst two terms of equation (1): Otherwise, the participation
constraints of investors would not be met and ￿nancial intermediation fails. A higher
ratio of the debt results in higher external costs, since it raises default probability of the
IF contracts and investors require higher returns from the IF contracts to satisfy their
participation constraint. The presence of the ￿rst two channels suggests that not only
the sum of both net worths but also the distribution of the two net worths matter in
determining the external ￿nance premium.
Borrowing rates
The two credit borrowing rates, namely, the entrepreneurial borrowing rate and the
FIs￿borrowing rate, are given by the FE and the IF contracts, respectively. The entre-
preneurial borrowing rate, denoted by ZE (st+1jst); is given as the contractual interest







!E (st+1jst)RE (st+1jst)Q(st)K (st)
Q(st)K (st) ￿ NE (st)
: (4)
Clearly, the numerator stands for the amount that the nondefaulting entrepreneurs repay
to the FIs, and the denominator for the amount of funds that entrepreneurs borrow from
the FIs.
Similarly, the FIs￿borrowing rate, denoted by ZF (st+1jst); is given by the contractual











Q(st)K (st) ￿ NF (st) ￿ NE (st)
; (5)
In equation (5), the numerator is the amount that the nondefaulting FIs repay to the
investors, and the denominator is the amount of funds that the FIs borrow from the
investors.
Dynamic behavior of net worth
The net worth of the FIs and the entrepreneurs, NF (st) and NE (st); depends on
their earnings from the credit contracts and their labor income. In addition to the pro￿ts
8Similarly to BGG (1999) and CMR (2008), the aggregation problem of the FIs and the entrepreneurs
becomes tractable thanks to the property of optimal credit contracts where the ratio of net worth to
capital is the same within FIs and within entrepreneurs.








7stemming from entrepreneurial projects, both FIs and entrepreneurs inelastically supply
a unit of labor to ￿nal goods producers and receive labor income W F (st) and W E (st).
As we assume that each FI and entrepreneur survives to the next period with a constant







































































































V E (st); respectively.10
The net worth accumulations are a⁄ected by the exogenous shocks represented by
"NF (st) and "NE (st) that are orthogonal to the fundamental earnings described above.
We assume they are i.i.d. shocks. These two shocks capture ￿nancial shocks that re￿ ect
an ￿asset bubble,￿￿irrational exuberance,￿or an ￿innovation in the e¢ ciency of credit
contracts,￿ hitting the FI sector or the entrepreneurial sector. An adverse ￿nancial
shock causes a malfunctioning of the credit market by reducing borrowers￿net worth.
Because the subsequent credit contracts charge higher borrowing rates to the borrowers,
the external ￿nance premium becomes more costly than otherwise, leading to a decline
in aggregate investment.11
2.2 The Rest of the Economy
Household




































11The setting of these net worth shocks is borrowed from Gilchrist and Leahy (2002). See also CMR
(2008) and Nolan and Thoenissen (2009) for an interpretation of these net worth shocks under credit
market imperfection. In these studies, the exit ratio of entrepreneurs ￿E obeys the stochastic law of



































where C (st) is ￿nal goods consumption, H (st) is hours worked, D(st) is real deposits
held by the investors, W (st) is the real wage measured by the ￿nal goods; R(st) is the
real risk-free return from the deposit D(st) between time t and t + 1; ￿(st) is dividend
received from the ownership of retailers, and T (st) is a lump-sum transfer.12 ￿ 2 (0;1);
￿; and ￿ are the subjective discount factor, the elasticity of hours worked, and the utility
weight on hours worked, respectively. eB(st) is a preference shock with mean one that
provides the stochastic variation in the discount factor.
Final goods producer
The ￿nal goods Y (st) are composites of a continuum of retail goods Y (h;st): The
￿nal goods producer purchases retail goods in the competitive market, and sells the ￿nal
goods to a household and capital producers at price P (st). P (st) is the aggregate price
































The retailers h 2 [0;1] are populated over a unit interval, each producing di⁄erenti-










where y (h;st) for h 2 [0;1] are the wholesale goods used for producing the retail goods
Y (h;st) by retailer h 2 [0;1]: The retailers are price takers in the input market and
choose their inputs taking the input price 1=X (st) as given. However, they are mo-
nopolistic suppliers in their output market, and set their prices to maximize pro￿ts.















12Here, the households are implicitly insured for their deposits. As the budget constraint equation
shows, they always receive the risk-free interest rate R(st).





; following Calvo (1983). Retailers who cannot reoptimize

















where ￿ (st￿1) denotes the gross rate of in￿ ation in period t ￿ 1, that is, ￿ (st￿1) =
P (st￿1)=P (st￿2): ￿ denotes a steady state in￿ ation rate, and ￿p 2 [0;1] is a parameter
that governs the size of price indexation. Denoting the price set by the active retailers
by P ￿ (h;st) and the demand curve the active retailer faces in period t+l by Y ￿ ￿
h;st+l￿
,
retailer h￿ s optimization problem with respect to its product price P ￿ (h;st) is written























































Using equations (10);(11); and (12); the ￿nal goods Y (st) produced in period t are


























Moreover, because of stickiness in the retail goods price, the aggregate price index



















The wholesalers produce wholesale goods y (st) and sell them to the retailers with
the relative price 1=X (st): They hire three types of labor inputs, H (st); HF (st); and
HE (st); and borrow capital K (st￿1): These labor inputs are supplied by the household,
the FIs, and the entrepreneurs for wages W (st); W F (st); and W E (st); respectively.
Capital is supplied by the entrepreneurs with the rental price RE (st): At the end of each
10period, the capital is sold back to the entrepreneurs at price Q(st): The maximization




















































































denotes the level of wholesale production technology and ￿ 2 (0;1],
￿; ￿F and ￿E are the depreciation rate of capital goods, the capital share, the share of
the FIs￿labor inputs, and the share of entrepreneurial labor inputs, respectively.
Capital goods producers
The capital goods producers own the technology that converts ￿nal goods to capital
goods. In each period, the capital goods producers purchase I (st) amounts of ￿nal
goods from the ￿nal goods producers. In addition, they purchase K (st￿1)(1 ￿ ￿) of
used capital goods from the entrepreneurs at price Q(st). They then produce new
capital goods K (st); using the technology FI; and sell them in the competitive market























































Note that ￿ is a parameter that is associated with investment technology with an ad-
justment cost, where eI(st) is the shock to the adjustment cost.13 Here, the development
in the total capital available at period t is described as




entrepreneurs at the end of the period. This is because we assume, following BGG (1999), that the price
of old capital that the entrepreneurs sell to the capital goods producers, say Q(st); is close to the price












































where eG(st) is the stochastic component of government spending.
Monetary authority
In our baseline model, the monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate Rn (st);

























where GDP (st) is de￿ned as the sum of consumption, investment, and government
expenditure, ￿ is the autoregressive parameter of the policy rate, ￿￿ and ￿y are the






respectively, and eR(st) is the shock to the monetary policy rule. Potential output is
de￿ned as the steady-state level of output, GDP.15 Because the monetary authority
determines the nominal interest rate, the real interest rate in the economy is given by


















































































14In the current paper, we do not study the unconventional monetary policies conducted or discussed
during the Great Recession. See HSU (2011) for the implication of some of the unconventional monetary
policies, including the spread adjusted Taylor rules and the capital injection to the economy based on
the chained-credit model.
15In addition to the current model, for sensitivity analysis we estimate the model in which the potential
output is de￿ned as the output achieved under ￿ exible prices. Our quantitative results on the importance
of the FIs￿net worth shock are essentially unchanged under this alternative setting.
12Note that the fourth and the ￿fth terms on the right-hand side of the equation represent
the monitoring costs incurred by the FIs and the investors, respectively. The last two
terms are the FIs￿and the entrepreneurs￿consumption.
Law of motion for non-￿nancial exogenous variables
There are ￿ve equations for the shock processes, eA (st);eI (st), eB (st);eG (st); and


































































where ￿A; ￿I; ￿B; ￿G; and ￿R 2 (0;1) are autoregressive roots of the exogenous variables,
and "A (st);"I (st);"B (st);"G (st); and "R (st) are innovations that are mutually inde-








An equilibrium consists of a set of prices, fP (h;st) for h 2 [0;1]; P(st); X(st); R(st);
RF (st); RE (st);W (st); W F (st); W E (st); Q(st); RF (st+1jst); RE (st+1jst); ZF (st+1jst);
ZE (st+1jst)g1





t=0 ffy(h;st)); Y (h;st) for h 2 [0;1]; Y (st); GDP (st); C (st); D(st); I (st);
K (st); H (st); HF (st); HE (st)gg1
t=0; for a given government policy fRn (st); Gt (st);
T (st)g1
t=0, realization of exogenous variables f"A (st); eB(st); eG(st); eI(st); "R (st);
"NE (st); "NF (st)g1
t=0 and initial conditions NF
￿1; NE
￿1; K￿1 such that for all t and h:
(1) the household maximizes its utility given the prices;
(2) the FIs maximize their pro￿ts given the prices;
(3) the entrepreneurs maximize their pro￿ts given the prices;
(4) the ￿nal goods producers maximize their pro￿ts given the prices;
(5) the retail goods producers maximize their pro￿ts given the prices;
(6) the wholesale goods producers maximize their pro￿ts given the prices;
(7) the capital goods producers maximize their pro￿ts given the prices;
(8) the government budget constraint holds; and
(9) markets clear.
133 Estimation
Following Christensen and Dib (2008), we set some of the parameters to the values
used in the existing studies. These include the quarterly discount factor ￿; the quarterly
depreciation rate ￿; the capital share ￿; the risk-free rate R; the degree of substitutability
￿; the labor supply elasticity ￿; the utility weight of labor ￿; and the steady state share
of government expenditure in ￿nal goods output G=Y . See Table 1-1 for the values of
these parameters.
We estimate the rest of parameters of the model using a Bayesian method. Estimated
parameters are the frequency of price adjustment ￿p; a parameter that controls the capital
adjustment cost ￿; the degree of price indexation ￿p, the coe¢ cients of the policy rule
￿; ￿￿ and ￿y; the autoregressive parameters of the shock process ￿A; ￿I; ￿B; ￿G; and





R; as well as the variances of
the shocks to net worth ￿2
NF and ￿2
NE: In addition, we also estimate the six ￿nancial
parameters, the lenders￿monitoring cost in the IF contract ￿F, the lenders￿monitoring
cost in the FE contract ￿E; the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic productivity
shock in the FI sector ￿F, the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic productivity shock
in the entrepreneurial sector ￿E, the survival rate of the FIs ￿F; and the survival rate of
the entrepreneurs ￿E.
To calculate the posterior distribution and to evaluate the marginal likelihood of the
model, the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is employed. To do this, a sample of 200,000
draws was created, neglecting the ￿rst 100,000 draws.16
3.1 Data
Our benchmark dataset includes seven time series for the U.S. economy from 1984Q1 to
2010Q4: namely, real GDP, real consumption, real investment, the log di⁄erence of the
GDP de￿ ator, the federal funds (FF) rate, the sum of the net worth of the FI sector
and the entrepreneurial sector, and the net worth of the FI sector. Following CMR
(2008, 2009), we use the S&P500 stock index and the S&P SPRCM Banks Index as our
measure of the total net worth and the FIs￿net worth, respectively.17 In addition to this
benchmark dataset, we incorporate two additional credit spread series into the dataset
and reestimate the model in our sensitivity analysis reported in Section 3.5. There,
we employ the time series of the CD rate minus the FF rate, and the BAA corporate
16All estimations are done with Dynare.
17Admittedly, the equity series reported in the Flow of Funds Account rather than the stock price
series may also well track the movement of the net worths. In addition to the estimation using the stock
price series as the model￿ s net worth series, we estimate the model using the equity series reported in
the Flow of Funds Accounts. As far as the quantitative roles of the ￿nancial shocks in the investment
variations are concerned, these two estimation strategy yield the similar result. See the early version of
our paper, HSU (2010), for details.
14bond rate minus the FF rate, as our measures of the spreads ZF (st+1jst) ￿ R(st) and
ZE (st+1jst) ￿ R(st) in the model.18
All of the variables other than the log di⁄erence of the GDP de￿ ator, the FF rate
and the two spreads, when used, are ￿rst di⁄erenced. Following CMR (2008, 2009), we
impose the condition that for each of the endogenous variables, the mean in the model
coincides with the mean in the data. In estimating the model, therefore, we remove the
sample mean of the growth rate of real GDP, real consumption, real investment, net
worth, the level of the FF rate, and the log di⁄erence of the GDP de￿ ator. We depict
all data series used in the estimation in Figure 1.
3.2 Prior and Posterior Distribution of the Parameters
Prior distribution of the non-￿nancial parameters
Table 2 reports the results of the parameter estimates. The adjustment cost parame-
ter for investment ￿ is normally distributed with a mean of 4.0 and a standard deviation
of 1.5; the Calvo probability ￿p is beta distributed with a mean of 0.5 and a standard
deviation of 0.15; the degree of indexation to past in￿ ation ￿p is beta distributed with a
mean of 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.2; the policy weight on the lagged policy rate
￿ is normally distributed with a mean of 0.75 and a standard deviation of 0.1; the policy
weight on the in￿ ation ￿￿ is normally distributed with a mean of 1.5 and a standard
deviation of 0.125; and the policy weight on the output gap ￿y is normally distributed
with a mean of 0.125 and a standard deviation of 0.05.
The priors on the stochastic processes of the exogenous shocks are set to follow an
AR(1) process with autoregressive parameters ￿A; ￿I; ￿B; ￿G; and ￿R, which are beta
distributed with a mean of 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.2. The variances of the







R are assumed to
follow an inverse-gamma distribution with a mean of 0.01.
Prior mean of the ￿nancial parameters
To set the prior mean of the six ￿nancial parameters, we use the following equilibrium
conditions
(1) the spread between the return to capital and the risk-free rate, RE ￿ R; equals
to 2% annually;
(2) the ratio of net worth held by the FIs to capital, NF=QK, is 0.1;
(3) the ratio of net worth held by entrepreneurs to capital, NE=QK, is 0.5;
(4) the annualized failure rate of the FIs is 3%;
(5) the annualized failure rate of the entrepreneurs is 3%;
18We hereafter call the two spreads the FIs￿borrowing spread and the entrepreneurial borrowing
spread, respectively.
15(6) the ratio of the spread between the FIs￿lending rate and the FIs￿borrowing rate,
ZE ￿ZF; to the spread between the FIs￿borrowing rate and the risk-free rate, ZF ￿R;
equals 337bps/58bps.
The conditions (1), (3), (4), and (5) are borrowed from BGG (1999). To obtain
condition (2), we construct the corresponding time series for NF=QK from the FIs￿net
worth divided by the total net worth, and take its historical average, based on the Flow
of Funds Accounts.19 To obtain condition (6), we construct the historical average of the
ratio from 1980 to 2008, using the BAA yield, the 3-months CD rate, and the 3-months
TIBOR as proxy for the FI￿ s lending rate ZE; the FIs￿borrowing rate ZF, and the risk-
free rate R; respectively. See Table 1-2 for detail. The standard deviation of the ￿nancial
parameters are slightly narrow, 0.010, 0.002, 0.005, and 0.010, respectively.
Posterior Distribution
The last three columns in Table 2 display the posterior mean and the con￿dence
intervals of the model parameters.20 For the investment adjustment cost, we obtain
￿ = 7:21. This value falls between the estimates of 0.65 (Meier and Muller, 2006) and
32.1 (Ireland, 2003) in existing studies. Our estimates of the Calvo probability and
degree of indexation are ￿p = 0:79 and ￿p = 0:08, respectively: The degree of nominal
price rigidity implied from these parameter values is smaller than the ￿ndings in Meier
and Muller (2006). The estimated monetary policy rule exhibits aggressive response to
current in￿ ation ￿￿ = 1:52; with inertia of the interest rate ￿ = 0:77; and a mild response
to current output ￿y = 0:05.
In estimating the six ￿nancial parameters, we assume that conditions (2) and (3) hold.
Estimates of the parameters are ￿F = 0:065 and ￿E = 0:015 for the monitoring costs;
￿F = 0:082 and ￿E = 0:266 for the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic productivities,
and ￿F = 0:96 and ￿E = 0:98 for the survival rates: The steady-state spreads implied
from the estimated parameters are 0.94% for the spread between the return to capital
and the risk-free rate RE ￿ R; 1.15% for the entrepreneurial borrowing spread ZE ￿ R;
and 0.11% for the FIs￿borrowing spread ZF ￿ R; in an annual rate, indicating that
the bulk of external ￿nance premium arises from the spread between the entrepreneurial
borrowing rate and the FI￿ s borrowing rate.
The table also includes the shock processes of the seven exogenous variables. The
government expenditure, productivity, and the preference processes are estimated to
be persistent with AR(1) coe¢ cients of 0.96, 0.95, and 0.90, respectively. The laws of
motion for the investment adjustment cost and the monetary policy rate are 0.81 and
0.24, which are relatively less persistent.
19Here, the FIs￿net worth and the entrepreneurial net worth are calculated from ￿corporate equities +
equity in the noncorporate business sector￿issued by the ￿nancial business sector and ￿corporate equities
+ equity in the noncorporate business sector￿issued by the non￿nancial business sector, respectively.
20See also Figure 2, where the posterior distributions of the model parameters (depicted in the thick
red line) are displayed with the prior distribution of the parameters (depicted in the thin black line).
163.3 Impulse Responses
To illustrate the role played by the shocks to the FIs￿net worth NF (st), Figure 3 plots
the economic responses to a negative shock to the net worth by one unit. The red dotted
line and the black line display the economy￿ s response to a shock to the entrepreneurial
net worth and the economy￿ s response to a shock to the FIs￿net worth, respectively.
An adverse shock to the net worth causes the downturn in the macroeconomy. The FIs￿
low net worth widens the two spreads, thereby reducing investment and output. Since a
limited borrower￿ s net worth yields a higher leverage and default probability of the bor-
rowing sectors, the external ￿nance becomes more costly than otherwise. Consequently,
the two credit spreads, the entrepreneurial borrowing spread and the FIs￿borrowing
spread, ZE (st+1jst)￿R(st) and ZF (st+1jst)￿R(st); widen, dampening investment and
output. Although the shock to the net worth is a one-time shock and therefore has no
inertia, its impacts on the economy are persistent. That is, as the demand for capital
goods K (st) is weakened, the capital price Q(st) falls, leading to a further decrease in
the investment owing to the endogenous declines in the entrepreneurial net worth as well
as the FIs￿net worth.
For the purpose of comparison, we also depict impulse responses to a unit negative
shock to the entrepreneurial net worth NE (st). Time paths of the variables after the
shock are similar to those after the shock to the FIs￿net worth, but smaller. As pointed
out in HSU (2009), for the same size of the shock, a shock to the FIs￿net worth has a
greater economic consequence than that to the entrepreneurial net worth.
3.4 Importance of Shocks to the FI Sector
Description of the time series of the shocks to the FIs￿net worth
We now study how the shocks to the FIs￿net worth a⁄ect the credit market and
the real economy throughout the sample period. Figure 4 displays the time series of
the seven structural shocks together with the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) business cycle periods. The realizations of the FIs￿net worth shocks are cyclical,
typically taking large negative values during the recession. Particularly, during the Great
Recession, several quarters since 2007, the exogenous net worth decline in the FI sector
has been unprecedentedly deep and persistent.
Compared with the shocks to entrepreneurial net worth that are also depicted in
Figure 4, variations of shocks to the FIs￿net worth are relatively moderate. Although the
two shock series sometimes move di⁄erently over the sample period, they simultaneously
drop substantially at the outset of the Great Recession.
Both shock series are negatively correlated with the ￿nancial indicators of credit
market stress. For example, the contemporaneous correlations of each of the two shock
series, the shocks to the FIs￿net worth and those to the entrepreneurial net worth, and
the BAA corporate bond rate minus the FF rate are 0.22 and 0.30, respectively. That
17indicates the link between the decline in the net worth in the borrowing sector and
￿nancial stress.
The role played by the shocks to the FIs￿net worth
The shocks to the FIs￿net worth bring about variations in both ￿nancial variables
and real variables. In Figures 5 and 6, we depict the model-generated time path of the
FIs￿borrowing spread ZF (st+1jst) ￿ R(st) and the entrepreneurial borrowing spread
ZE (st+1jst)￿R(st) by the black line, and the actual time path of the data counter parts
by the red line with circle.21 The two model-generated series have strong co-movement
with the corresponding actual time series. The contemporaneous correlation between
ZF (st+1jst) ￿ R(st) and the three-month CD rate minus the FF rate is 0.56, and that
between ZE (st+1jst) ￿ R(st) and the BAA corporate bond rate minus the FF rate is
0.62, respectively.22
Figure 7 displays the time path of investment. To see the role played by the shocks
to FIs￿net worth in detail, we decompose the investment variations into the proportions
explained by each of the ￿nancial shocks and the non-￿nancial shocks. In the six pan-
els, the solid blue line depicts the investment growth and white bar depicts a shock￿ s
contribution.23
Among the three episodes of the economic downturn, the shocks to the FIs￿net
worth are the main driving force behind the investment decline during the ￿rst and third
recessions. In particular, in the Great Recession that begins with ￿nancial turmoil and
the collapse of FI institutions, their negative impacts are unprecedentedly large, lowering
the investment for nearly three years. By contrast, in the second recession following the
bursting of the dot-com bubble, the shocks barely play any role.
To assess the signi￿cance of the FIs￿net worth shock relative to other shocks, we
compute the historical decomposition for variations of investment together with those
of other economic variables.24 Tables 3-1 and 3-2 display the variance decomposition
of the FIs￿borrowing spread ZF (st+1jst)￿R(st); the entrepreneurial borrowing spread
ZE (st+1jst)￿ZF (st+1jst); GDP GDP (st), investment I (st), and in￿ ation ￿ (st) for the
periods during the Great Recession and after (2007Q1:2010Q4) as well as for the entire
sample period.
21In the analysis for both model-implied series and the related actual data, we focus on their business-
cycle components (six quarters to 32 quarters) and extract these components by applying the band-pass
￿lter to the original series.
22Here, the three-month CD rate and the BAA corporate bond rate serve as the proxy for the FIs￿
borrowing rate and the entrepreneurial borrowing rate. The corresponding data series for R(st) is
calculated as the policy rate divided by the aggregate price level in the model.
23For the preference shocks "B
t and the exogenous spending shocks "G
t ; we report only sum of the
contributions because their quantitative impacts are relatively small.
24In calculating the variance decompositions, we ￿rst calculate the historical variance of a model-
generated endogenous variable when only one of the shocks is fed into the model. We then sum these
variances to calculate the share of each shock in explaining the variations of the endogenous variables.
18In the period of the Great Recession and after, the shocks to the FIs￿net worth are
the main driver behind the reduction in the investment and the widening of the entre-
preneurial borrowing spread variation, accounting for 36% and 46% of their variations.
The severe deterioration in the FIs￿net worth at that time causes a drastic widening
of the entrepreneurial borrowing spread, leading to a quantitatively signi￿cant scale of
investment decline. This quantitative result is consistent with the peculiar feature of the
Great Recession that involves the ￿nancial market turmoil and the collapses of major
banking institutions.25
Over the U.S. business cycles, the shocks to the FIs￿net worth are one of the im-
portant sources of the investment variations and the entrepreneurial borrowing spread
variations. The shock is the third largest contributor of the investment variations and the
second largest contributor of the entrepreneurial borrowing spread variations, accounting
for 17% and 35% of the variations, respectively.
By contrast, its quantitative impact on the other economic variables is minor. They
explain only 4% of the variations in output and in￿ ation, and 10% of the variations in
the FIs￿borrowing spread.
The role played by the other shocks
The shock to the entrepreneurial net worth is also quantitatively important for the
business cycle. Over the entire sample period, it is the key determinant of investment dy-
namics, accounting for 38% of the variations. In particular, in the recession following the
bursting of the dot-com bubble, the shocks generate the bulk of investment reduction. In
the Great Recession, it is the second largest driver of the investment decline, accounting
for 28% of the variations. Together with the shocks to the FIs￿net worth, the shocks
explain more than half of the investment variations since the mid-1980s, suggesting the
importance of the ￿nancial shocks in the U.S. economy.
Similarly to the shocks to the FIs￿ net worth, the contribution of the shocks to
the entrepreneurial net worth in output and in￿ ation variations is relatively minor. In
the current model, these variables are mostly explained by the preference shocks and
technology shocks.
3.5 Sensitivity Analysis
We have seen up to now that shocks to the FI sector play a quantitatively important
role, particularly in the U.S. investment variations. In our analysis, we have assumed
that ￿nancial shocks originating in the FI sector take the form of exogenous change in
the FIs￿net worth, and that our benchmark dataset is su¢ cient to identify these shocks.
In this section, we conduct sensitivity tests by incorporating another type of ￿nancial
25Comapred with our earlier version HSU (2010), we obtain a larger contribution of FIs￿net worth
shock to investment during the recent ￿nancial crisis and a smaller contribution before that period.
These di⁄erences arise for two reasons. First and most importantly, we use the stock price index as a
proxy for net worth. Second, we estimate parameters associated with credit markets.
19shock to the FI sector as well as the net worth shock, and by including the spread series
in the dataset of estimation so as to see the identi￿ed ￿nancial shocks are unchanged.
First, while most of the studies on banking shocks concentrate on the shocks that
directly change FIs￿net worth,26 we consider a di⁄erent type of exogenous shock, ￿risk-
iness shocks,￿along with the shocks to the net worth. CMR (2008, 2009) study the
economy in which credit market imperfection is worsened by the exogenous increase in
the variance of borrowers￿idiosyncratic productivity called ￿riskiness.￿Realization of
the riskiness shock is independent of the net worth shock, and the shock captures the
variations in the external ￿nance premium that does not stem from the exogenous net
worth variations. Closely following CMR (2008, 2009), we now assume that the stan-
dard deviations of idiosyncratic productivity shocks of borrowers are time-variant, so































where ￿￿F and ￿￿E are autoregressive parameters, "￿F (st) and "￿E (st) are the corre-
sponding innovations, and ￿F and ￿E are the steady state values of riskiness. As shown
in HSU (2009, 2011), a rise in either ￿F (st) or ￿E (st) increases the payment to the
lender, causing a higher external ￿nance premium and a downturn in investment, even
when there are no variations in the net worth.
Second, we reformulate the estimation using the spread data. In the benchmark
estimation, we choose not to employ the spread series in identifying shocks, because the
data series representing overall ￿nancial conditions of the FIs and entrepreneurs that are
needed for constructing the spread series matching our spreads series ZF (st+1jst)￿R(st)
and ZE (st+1jst)￿R(st) are not available. In fact, the choice of observable variables used
for estimating the ￿nancial accelerator model di⁄ers across studies. For instance, while
Christensen and Dib (2008) and De Graeve (2008) employ neither series in estimation,
Nolan and Thoenissen (2009) use only net worth series but not the spread series. By
contrast, CMR (2008, 2009) employ the spread series, the BAA￿AAA yield on corporate
bonds as a measure of external ￿nance premium in estimation, to distill ￿nancial shocks
to the credit market. The second sensitivity check thus intends to see how our results
change if spread series are added to the estimation.
We conduct two alternative formulations, estimation I and estimation II. In es-
timation I, the dataset for the estimation fCt; GDPt; It; Rn





t ￿ Rt; ZE
t ￿ Rtg
2010Q4
t=1984Q1 includes the two spread series, the CD rate minus the FF
rate for ZF (st+1jst) ￿ R(st) and the BAA corporate bond rate minus the FF rate for
26See, for example, Chen (2001), Meh and Moran (2004), and Aikman and Paustian (2006).
20ZE (st+1jst)￿R(st), respectively. In addition, the estimated model incorporate the risk-
iness shocks as well as the net worth shocks. This approach is close to CMR (2008,
2009). In estimation II, the same dataset used in the benchmark estimation is utilized.
Again, the model incorporates the riskiness shocks as well as the net worth shocks. This
approach also encompasses CMR (2008, 2009), who argue for the importance of the
riskiness shock.
The results are shown in Table 4. The estimated impact of the shocks to the FI
sector is robust to incorporating the other type of shock to the FI, and to including the
spread data into the dataset. The contribution of shocks to FIs￿net worth amounts to
12% and 17% in the investment variations in estimations I and II, respectively.27
3.6 Importance of Chained Credit Contracts
In contrast to the existing ￿nancial accelerator models, our model introduces the endoge-
nous developments in the FIs￿net worth and credit market imperfection that originates
from them. To illustrate the implication of this additional source of the ￿nancial accel-
erator e⁄ect, we conduct two comparison analyses in this last subsection.
First, we examine if our model ￿ts the data, compared with the model that abstracts
from the credit market imperfection in the FI sector. To do this, we develop a model
called the ￿BGG model￿ in which the entrepreneurs are credit constrained but the FIs
are not.28 We then estimate the BGG model and our benchmark model, using the same




t=1984Q1 to see which model better explains the data.
The results of this estimation are shown in Table 5.29 The value of the log marginal
data density under the BGG model is lower than that under the benchmark model,





t=1984Q1. Given equal prior odds, the posterior odds ratios of the
benchmark model and the BGG model are 0.93 and 0.07, respectively. Since the two
models di⁄er only in the ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ect stemming from the FIs￿net worth,
27In contrast to the net worth shocks, the riskiness shocks explain only a small fraction of the invest-
ment variations. This contrasts sharply with CMR (2009) where such shock explains a sizable portion
of the variations. In their paper, the riskiness shock consists of anticipated components as well as
the contemporaneous unexpected components, and one possible explanation for the di⁄erence between
their result and ours is that the anticipated component of the riskiness plays an important role in the
investment variations.
28This BGG model employs the same setting as the ￿nancial accelerator model of BGG (1999). The
only di⁄erence is that, in our BGG model, we estimate the most of the model parameters rather than
calibrate them. A full description of the BGG model is provided in Appendix C. We estimate parameters
f￿p; ￿; ￿p; ￿E; ￿E; ￿E; ￿; ￿￿; ￿yg and shock processes f￿A; ￿I; ￿B; ￿G; ￿R; ￿A; ￿I; ￿B; ￿G; ￿R;;￿NEg;




t=1984Q1: The rest of the parameters are calibrated to the
U.S. economy.
29In estimating the benchmark model, we do not use the data of the FIs￿net worth, so that the
outcomes are comparable between the BGG model and the benchmark model.
21the di⁄erence in the log marginal data density shows the importance of the IF contract
that is chained to the FE contracts in explaining the data.30
Second, we ask if introducing shocks to the FIs￿net worth changes our understanding
of the source of the investment variations. Early studies that abstract from the shocks
originating in the credit market report that a bulk of economic variations is attributed to
the shocks to the investment technology. According to Christensen and Dib (2008), more
than 90% of investment variations originate in the shocks to investment e¢ ciency. On the
other hand, Nolan and Thoenissen (2009), based on the model that does not incorporate
shocks to the investment technology, report that ￿nancial shocks originating in the credit
market are important. Because our model has both ￿nancial shocks to the credit market
"NE
t and "NF
t , and the non-￿nancial shocks that directly a⁄ect the investment adjustment
cost technology "I
t, we can separate the contributions of the former shocks from those of
the latter shocks.
To illustrate the role played by the shocks to the FIs￿net worth, we estimate one
other model, which we call the ￿Non-FA (Non ￿nancial accelerator) model,￿ 31 where no
credit market imperfection prevails in the economy, along with the BGG model and the
benchmark model by a Bayesian method.32 Table 6 reports the variance decompositions
of investment variations under the three models. Under the Non-FA model, a bulk of
the variations, 74%, comes from the shocks to investment adjustment cost "I
t; being in
line with the ￿ndings reported in Christensen and Dib (2008). When ￿nancial shocks
originating in the credit market are incorporated into the model, however, the estimated
contribution of the non-￿nancial shocks become lower. The contribution of shocks to
the investment adjustment cost technology "I
t is reduced to 51% and 28%, respectively,
in the BGG model and the benchmark model. By contrast, a portion of investment
variations attributed to the ￿nancial shocks become larger. In the BGG model, the
shock to entrepreneurial net worth accounts for 22% of the investment variations. In the
benchmark model, the two ￿nancial shocks account for 55% of the variations. Clearly,
the ￿nancial shocks are the key determinant of investment variations, though the non-
￿nancial shocks are not negligible source of the variations.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we quantitatively assess the role played by the shocks to the FIs￿net worth
in the U.S. business cycle. To this end, we estimate and simulate the ￿nancial accelerator
30Christensen and Dib (2008) conclude using the log-likelihood ratio test that their ￿nancial acceler-
ator model outperforms the model that abstracts from the ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ect.
31We provide a full description of the Non-FA model in Appendix C. For the Non-FA model, we
estimate parameters f￿; ￿; ￿p; ￿; ￿￿; ￿yg and shock processes f￿A; ￿I; ￿B; ￿G; ￿R; ￿A; ￿I; ￿B; ￿G;
￿Rg; ; using the data set fCt; GDPt; It; ￿t; Rn
t g
2010Q4
t=1984Q1: The rest of the parameters are calibrated to
the U.S. economy.
32In estimating the benchmark model, we employ the full dataset including the FIs￿net worth.
22model in HSU (2009, 2011), in which FIs along with entrepreneurs are credit constrained.
In this model, once net worth in the FI sector falls, the cost of external ￿nance increases,
reducing investment. Consequently, endogenous developments in the FIs￿net worth
as well those in the entrepreneurial net worth become a key to the ampli￿cation and
propagation mechanism in the economy.
Employing a Bayesian method, we distill the shocks to the FIs￿net worth from the
U.S. dataset that includes the FIs￿net worth. These shocks typically take negative
values during a recession, particularly during the Great Recession that began in 2007.
We ￿nd that the shocks to the FI sector play an important role behind the investment
variations. In particular, in the Great Recession, these shocks are the key driving force of
the investment collapse, accounting for 36% for investment variations during the period.
The quantitative role of these shocks is minor in the variations of the other variables,
such as output and in￿ ation, contributing about 4% of their variations.
Extending the current model to other dimensions may help achieve a clearer idea of
the relationship between the ￿nancial market and the macroeconomy. First, it is im-
portant to incorporate the interbank market into the model. While the current model
abstracts from the market, the repayment failure in the credit contracts between the FIs
and the subsequent collapse of the ￿nancial system was a common concern of the market
participants and policy makers at that time. Second, future work needs to address why
the ￿nancial shocks in our model play a limited role in explaining macroeconomic vari-
ables other than investment. As current research by CMR (2009) suggests, consideration
for anticipated components of the ￿nancial shocks may lead to a better understanding
of the linkage between the ￿nancial sector and the economy.
23A Credit Contract
In this section, we discuss how the contents of the two credit contracts are determined
by the pro￿t maximization problem of the FIs. We ￿rst explain how the FIs earn pro￿t
from the credit contracts, and then explain the participation constraints of the other
participants in the credit contracts.









share of FIs earnings received by the FI



























where ￿(st+1jst) is a probability weight for state st+1 for given state st: Here, the ex-
pected return on the loans to entrepreneurs, RF (st+1jst) is given by
share of entrepreneurial earnings received by the FI

















































This equation indicates that the two credit contracts determine the FIs￿pro￿ts. In the
FE contract, the FIs receive a portion of what entrepreneurs earn from their projects as
their gross pro￿t. In the IF contract, the FIs receive a portion of what they receive from
the FE contract as their net pro￿t, and pay the rest to the investors.
There is a participation constraint in each of the credit contracts. In the FE contract,
the entrepreneurs￿expected return is set to equal to the return from their alternative
option. We assume that without participating in the FE contract, entrepreneurs can
purchase capital goods with their own net worth NE (st): Note that the expected return
from this option equals to RE (st+1)NE (st). Therefore the FE contract is agreed by the
entrepreneurs only when the following inequality is expected to hold:
share of entrepreneurial earnings kept by the entrepreneur

































We next consider a participation constraint of the investors in the IF contract. We
assume that there is a risk free rate of return in the economy R(st); and investors may
24alternatively invest in this asset. Consequently, for investors to join the IF contract, the
loans to the FIs must equal the opportunity cost of lending. That is
share of FIs￿earnings received by the investors






















































The FI maximizes its expected pro￿t (27) by optimally choosing the variables !F (st+1jst);
!E (st+1jst) and K (st); subject to the investors￿participation constraint (30) and entre-





































































































Using equations (28) and (30), we obtain equation (1) in the text.
25B Equilibrium Conditions of the Benchmark Model
In this appendix, we describe the equilibrium system of our benchmark model. We
express it in ￿ve blocks of equations.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(5) Policies and Shock Process
Policies for the shock process are given by equations (16), (17), (20), (21), (22), (23)
and (24).
29C Equilibrium Conditions of Alternative Models
In addition to the benchmark model, we consider two alternative models for comparative
convenience. The ￿rst is the ￿Non-FA model￿in which no ￿nancial accelerator mecha-
nism is incorporated. The equilibrium conditions under this model are given by equations
(16), (17), (20), (21), (22), (23), (24), (32), (33), (34), (36), (37), (38), (39), and (49),


























￿Y (st)=K (st) + Q(st+1)(1 ￿ ￿)
Q(st)
: (53)
The second model is the ￿BGG model￿in which only entrepreneurs are credit con-
strained. The equilibrium conditions in this model are given by equations (7), (16), (17),
(20), (21), (22), (23), (24), (32), (33), (34), (36), (37), (38), (39), (41), (43), (45), (47)
and (49), and the following three equations instead of equations (31), (35) and (38) under
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Figure 1: Time series of the data employed in the model
estimation. The ￿rst seven variables constitute the
benchmark dataset, and the last two variables are used
only in the sensitivity analysis. The periods of the NBER
recessions are shaded in blue.






































































































































































Figure 2: The posterior distribution of the model parameters (depicted in the thick red
line) and the prior distribution of the parameters (depicted in the thin black line).
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Figure 3: Impulse response of investment, output (GDP), in￿ ation, Tobin￿ s Q, the spread
ZE (st+1jst) ￿ R(st); and the spread ZF (st+1jst) ￿ R(st) to an equal size of net worth
shocks. The red dotted line and the black line displays the economy￿ s response to a shock
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Figure 4: Time series of the structural shocks obtained from the















Figure 5: The time path of the spread between the FIs￿borrowing rate and
the risk-free rate ZF (st+1jst)￿R(st): The red line with circle and the black
line display the time path of the actual data series (the spread between CD
three- month and FF rate) and the model-generated counterpart series,













Figure 6: The time path of the spread between the entrepreneurial borrowing
rate and the risk-free rate ZE (st+1jst) ￿ R(st): The red line with circle and
the black line display the time path of the actual data series (the spread
between BAA-rated corporate bonds and the FF rate) and the
model-generated counterpart series, respectively. The periods of the NBER
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Figure 7: Historical contribution of investment growth. Each panel displays the
investment growth explained by each of the structual shocks. The white bar depicts
the contribution of each shock in the investment growth and the blue line depicts
the investment growth. The periods of the NBER recessions are shaded in blue.
39Table 1-1: Calibrated Parameters33
Parameter Value Description
￿ .99 Discount factor
￿ .025 Depreciation rate
￿ .35 Capital share
R .99￿1 Risk free rate
￿ 6 Degree of substitutability
￿ 3 Elasticity of labor
￿ .3 Utility weight on leisure
G=Y .2 Share of government expenditure at steady state
Table 1-2: Steady state conditions under prior means
Variable Value Description








0:03=4 Default probability in the FE contract
nF 0:1 FIs￿net worth ratio
nE 0:5 Entrepreneurial net worth ratio
(ZE ￿ ZF)=(ZF ￿ R) 337=58
The spread between the FIs￿lending rate and the
FIs￿borrowing rate divided by the spread between
the FIs￿borrowing rate and the risk-free rate
33Figures are quarterly unless otherwise noted.
40Table 2: Prior and posterior distribution of parameters
Log marginal data density 2227.6
Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Distr. Mean St. Dev. Mean 5% 95%
￿p Beta 0.5 0.15 0.7966 0.7198 0.8738
￿ Normal 4 1.5 6.3767 4.5179 8.0726
￿p Beta 0.5 0.2 0.0803 0.0074 0.1498
￿E Normal 0.27 0.01 0.2650 0.2481 0.2818
￿F Normal 0.092 0.005 0.0818 0.0733 0.0895
￿E Normal 0.016 0.002 0.0150 0.0118 0.0182
￿F Normal 0.078 0.01 0.0651 0.0479 0.0816
￿E Beta 0.984 0.01 0.9842 0.9704 0.9983
￿F Beta 0.962 0.01 0.9628 0.9476 0.9794
￿ Beta 0.75 0.1 0.7678 0.7276 0.8138
￿￿ Normal 1.5 0.125 1.5158 1.3613 1.6702
￿y Normal 0.125 0.05 0.0488 0.0155 0.0846
￿B Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9026 0.8740 0.9319
￿I Beta 0.5 0.2 0.8051 0.7263 0.8947
￿A Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9515 0.9186 0.9830
￿G Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9610 0.9397 0.9845
￿R Beta 0.5 0.2 0.2441 0.1214 0.3651
￿B Inv. Gamma 0.01 Inf 0.0021 0.0016 0.0026
￿I Inv. Gamma 0.01 Inf 0.0067 0.0053 0.0081
￿G Inv. Gamma 0.01 Inf 0.0047 0.0041 0.0053
￿A Inv. Gamma 0.01 Inf 0.0098 0.0073 0.0123
￿R Inv. Gamma 0.01 Inf 0.0017 0.0015 0.0019
￿NE Inv. Gamma 0.01 Inf 0.2627 0.2308 0.2956
￿NF Inv. Gamma 0.01 Inf 0.0692 0.0577 0.0807
41Table 3: Variance decomposition
Table 3-1: 2007Q1-2010Q4
"B "I "G "A "R "NF "NE
ZF
t ￿ Rt 0.540 0.023 0.001 0.216 0.153 0.052 0.015
ZE
t ￿ Rt 0.007 0.024 0.001 0.001 0.147 0.455 0.366
GDPt 0.399 0.036 0.051 0.325 0.083 0.065 0.041
It 0.093 0.161 0.000 0.090 0.018 0.358 0.280
￿t 0.535 0.004 0.001 0.315 0.046 0.090 0.009
Table 3-2: 1984Q1-2010Q4
"B "I "G "A "R "NF "NE
ZF
t ￿ Rt 0.361 0.041 0.000 0.156 0.315 0.099 0.027
ZE
t ￿ Rt 0.005 0.052 0.001 0.005 0.106 0.349 0.482
GDPt 0.306 0.084 0.091 0.292 0.114 0.039 0.074
It 0.061 0.282 0.000 0.059 0.049 0.171 0.378
￿t 0.259 0.040 0.001 0.486 0.125 0.042 0.046
Note: The variance decompositions are given by the variance of macroeconomic vari-
ables accounted for by each of the listed shocks divided by the variance of the correspond-
ing macroeconomic variables accounted for by all of the shocks, based on the periods after
the Great Recession (the upper table) and the full sample period (the lower table).
42Table 4: Variance decomposition of investment under alternative estimation methodologies
"B "I "G "A "R "NF "NE "￿F "￿E
Benchmark 0.061 0.282 0.000 0.059 0.049 0.171 0.378 ￿ ￿
Estimation I 0.270 0.354 0.000 0.059 0.004 0.120 0.190 0.001 0.001
Estimation II 0.056 0.276 0.000 0.056 0.054 0.173 0.385 0.000 0.000
Note: The variance decompositions are given by the variance of investment accounted
for by each of the listed shocks divided by the variance of investment accounted for by
all of the shocks, based on the full sample period. In the estimation I, we include the
two credit spread series in the dataset and incorporate the two riskiness shocks into the
model. In estimation II, we maintain the dataset as that of the benchmark estimation
and incorporate the two riskiness shocks into the model.
43Table 5: Model Comparison
Chained BGG BGG
Log marginal data density 2145.16 2142.6
Posterior odds 0.93 0.07
44Table 6 : Variance Decomposition of Investment under Di⁄erent Models
"B "I "G "A "R "NE "NF
Chained BGG 0.061 0.282 0.000 0.059 0.049 0.378 0.171
BGG 0.114 0.507 0.000 0.142 0.013 0.224 ￿
Non-FA 0.106 0.739 0.000 0.153 0.001 ￿ ￿
Note: The variance decompositions are given by the variance of investment accounted
for by each of the listed shocks divided by the variance of investment accounted for by all
of the shocks, based on the full sample period. See Appendix C for the detailed settings
of the BGG model and the Non-FA model.
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